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STUDENT COMMENTS
RESCUE UNITS OPERATED BY MUNICIPAL FIRE DEPART-
MENTS: THEIR STATUS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
I. Introduction
F LATE, it has become a common practice among municipal-
ities in Ohio and some other states to operate ambulance
services, resuscitator units, or rescue squads as adjuncts of the
fire department.' This is sometimes done for the purpose of pro-
viding more rapid responses to calls from those injured in acci-
dents or stricken by sudden illnesses. In other instances the mu-
nicipality feels that it owes to its inhabitants an inexpensive (or
free) rescue or ambulance service. It is, however, probable that
the municipal authorities of at least some cities feel that the
money expended for salaries of firemen would be put to better
use if firemen had additional duties to perform besides the ex-
tinguishing of fires. Whatever the reason for the establishment
of these kinds of services, they present serious questions with
regard to the municipality's amenability to tort suits grounded
upon the negligent performance of such activities.
At the outset it should be indicated that the view taken by
this writer does not purport to be unbiased. Rather, it is his in-
tent to place a few more munitions in the arsenal of those who
propose that the doctrine of municipal sovereign immunity be
abrogated in its entirety.
The first part of the discussion (Section II) will focus upon
the background and current status of the municipal immunity
doctrine, with special emphasis upon the governmental-proprie-
tary distinction. Section III will discuss the effects and interpre-
tations of the Uniform Traffic Act and how they relate to munici-
pal immunity. In addition, another possible interpretation of the
Act will be suggested.
H. History and Present Status of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Sovereign Immunity has been variously described as follows:
"For generations .. .a major scandal" 2; ",,.. the most granitic
and resistant to change of all the immunities" 3; ,... a proper
I See Appendix.
2 31 American Trial Lawyer's Journal 188 (1967).
3 Id.
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subject for discussion by students of mythology ..." 4; "one of
the most discredited and yet sanctified doctrines in the great
moving stream of our common law . . ." 5; "... an anachronism
without rational basis . . . (which) has existed by the force of
inertia" 0; "(a doctrine which) has never been in tune with
American notions of responsible government." 7
Although a storm of criticism has raged over the validity of
this doctrine for many years, few states have completely or even
substantially eliminated it. Alaska, one of the scattered jurisdic-
tions which do not follow the doctrine, has announced that gov-
ernmental immunity has never been a part of the law in that
state; consequently a municipality in that state is liable for the
torts of its employees regardless of the nature of their activities.'
Nine states which formerly recognized sovereign immunity
have completely or partially disavowed the same and have held
municipalities liable for the torts of their police officers.9 The
Ohio courts, as early as 1919 in Fowler v. Cleveland,0 made an
attempt to break away from the doctrine of municipal immunity,
but there was a withdrawal from this progressive position in
1922 in the case of Aldrich v. Youngstown," which overruled the
Fowler decision.
The roots of sovereign immunity have been traced to Roman
antiquity. However the most frequent form in which this doc-
trine finds expression is in the old English maxim, "The King can
do no wrong." 12 The rationale and justification for the rule's
acceptance in the United States is a financial, rather than a legal
one. The early states simply could not afford an additional bur-
den on their already-strained budgets. In subsequent years
courts have often reiterated this reason for the rule or have
stated that it is better that an individual injury be uncompen-
sated than that the public be financially inconvenienced. The
4 Colorado Racing Commission v. Brush Racing Ass'n., 316 P. 2d 582 (1957).
5 32 American Trial Lawyer's Journal 286 (1968).
6 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92; 389 P. 2d 457
(1961).
7 Kline, Ohio Sovereign Immunity: Long Lives the King, 28 Ohio St. L. J.
75, 90 (1967).
8 City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P. 2d 201 (1962).
9 Dakin, "Municipal Liability in Police Torts," 16 Clev-Mar. L. Rev. 448,
450 (1967).
10 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919).
11 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
12 Supra note 7, at 75.
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courts generally have considered themselves bound by stare de-
cisis. However, in Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission1 3 the
court held that the doctrine of governmental immunity was judi-
cially created and therefore, could be judicially abolished. Quot-
ing Justice Holmes:
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past." 14
It would seem that when a theory supporting a rule of law
(governmental immunity) cannot, in a given instance, justly be
applied, then the theory should be disregarded and the rule
should be considered on its merits. Modern courts should recog-
nize that since sovereign immunity is a judge-created immunity,
a product of the courts, the courts themselves have both the
power and duty to modify or abrogate the doctrine if, as the
evidence suggests, it no longer serves a useful function.
It is generally held that municipal corporations exercise
powers and functions of two separate classes: governmental and
proprietary.15 In their governmental (also referred to as "public"
or "corporate") capacity, municipalities function as agents or
instrumentalities of the state government. 16 Hence, it is from the
state that municipal governments derive their governmental au-
thority and, thus, their immunity. Where the municipal functions
are of a private or proprietary nature, common law immunity
has no application. 17 Consequently, the issue in the usual tort suit
against a municipality is whether or not the officer or employee
causing the injury was engaged in the exercise of a governmental
function.
However, to a degree this governmental-v.-proprietary dis-
tinction has been changed by statute in Ohio. Regarding a
13 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P. 2d 107 (1963).
14 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
15 Tolliver v. Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 31 Ohio Op. 179, 62 N.E. 2d 357
(1945). See also: 38 Ohio Jur. 2d, Municipal Corps., § 251, p. 645 (1959).
16 Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336 (1878); Cleveland v. Clements
Bros. Const. Co., 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N.E. 885 (1902); Akron v. Butler, 108
Ohio St. 122, 140 N.E. 324 (1923); Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156
N.E. 210 (1927).
17 Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fremont, 154 Ohio St. 344, 131 N.E. 2d 221
(1955).
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municipality's liability for the negligent operation of its vehicles,
§ 701.02 of the Ohio Rev. Code provides:
"Any municipal corporation shall be liable in damages for
injury or loss to persons or property and for the death by
wrongful act caused by the negligence of its officers, agents
or servants while engaged in the operation of any vehicles
upon the public highways of the state, under the same rules
and subject to the same limitations as apply to private corpo-
rations for profit, but only when such officer, agent or servant
is engaged upon the business of the municipal corporation."
Were this the only paragraph of this statute, the effect would be
to place the State of Ohio in the forefront of those states which
have substantially altered the immunity concept. However, the
statute continues to say:
"The defense that the officer, agent or servant of the munici-
pal corporation was engaged in performing a governmental
function, shall be a full defense as to the negligence of:
(A) Members of the police department engaged in po-
lice duties;
(B) Members of the fire department while engaged in
duty at a fire, or while proceeding toward a place where
a fire is in progress, or in answering any other emergency
alarm."
The second paragraph of the statute makes it apparent that a
municipality is not liable for the negligent actions of a fireman
who caused injury while engaged in such "governmental" func-
tions as the extinguishing of a fire, the pursuit of a fire, or the
answering of an emergency alarm. The precise question to be
answered, therefore, is whether a municipal corporation's fire
department is engaged in a governmental function in answering
a call for a resuscitator, rescue unit, or ambulance.
The final section of § 701.02 deals with the personal liability
of policemen and firemen. It provides:
"... Firemen shall not be personally liable for damages for
injury or loss to persons or property and for death caused
while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle in the
performance of a governmental function.
Policemen shall not be personally liable for damage for in-
jury or loss to persons or property and for death caused
while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle while re-
sponding to an emergency call." (Emphasis added)
It should be noted that there is a different standard for police-
men than for firemen. The implication of the statutory distinc-
4
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tion-between policemen responding to an emergency call and
firemen engaged in the performance of a governmental function
-is clear. It is simply that not all activities of firemen are gov-
ernmental, notwithstanding their public service-related purpose.
The immunity enjoyed by firemen is, moreover, more restricted
than that enjoyed by policemen. This latter point was noted by
the Hamilton County Court of Appeals in the case of Rankin v.
Sander.1 8 Thus if a fireman operating an ambulance were negli-
gently to injure someone, the issue presented would be not
whether the defendant was responding to an emergency call as
a fireman, but rather, whether he was responding to an emer-
gency call as a fireman engaged in the performance of a govern-
mental function. If it were found that the activity of the mu-
nicipal fireman were proprietary, any claim of immunity arising
under the statute19 would be defeated, and the employee could
be held individually liable for his negligent acts. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Samuels20 reaches this result and
further holds that the employee may be held liable for his
negligence even though the municipality is immune from liability.
An objection to this result is that it compels the injured party
and/or the employee to bear the cost of that which should,
in fairness, be the responsibility of the governmental unit. An
alternative approach would be to pay municipal employees high
enough salaries to enable them to obtain protection against such
suits, but the cost of this approach would undoubtedly be greater
than the cost of assuming liability for valid damage claims.
The distinction between governmental and proprietary func-
tions is not an easy one to make, and classification sometimes be-
comes ludicrous. In many instances the same function has been
called governmental by the courts of one state and proprietary
by those of another.21 There is nothing inherent in particular
functions by which they can be classified. 22 For example, in Bay
City, Michigan, an employee of a telephone company was killed
because of the negligence of the city's agents in maintaining elec-
tric wires. The city's electric light plant furnished direct current
18 96 Ohio App. 40, 54 Ohio Op. 164, 166 (1953).
19 Ohio Rev. Code § 701.02 (1965).
20 116 Ohio St. 586, 157 N.E. 325 (1927).
21 Smith, Municipal Tort Immunity, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41, 44 (1949); Case
Note, Municipal Corporations: Tort Liablifty, 14 Corn. L.Q. 351 (1929).
22 Id.
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for lighting public streets and buildings, and sold alternating
current for use in private homes. The court held that since the
injury resulted from negligence in maintaining wires carrying
alternating current, sold for profit, the city was liable. The court
added, however, that if the death had been caused by negligence
in maintaining wires carrying direct current, the city would not
have been liable.23 Thus, it appears that one can distinguish be-
tween governmental electricity and proprietary electricity. The
tendency of the courts to emphasize the profit element in catego-
rizing the activity leads to speculation as to what the result would
be in a city which as a community enterprise collects certain kinds
of refuse without charge, but makes a charge for the collection
of other kinds. Presumably it could be argued that a distinction
must be made between governmental and proprietary garbage. 24
The Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing between governmental and proprietary functions. In
Hyde v. City of Lakewood25 the court stated:
"Whether the performance of various activities by a munici-
pality is governmental or proprietary frequently depends on
the peculiar facts of the particular case. In one instance
a municipally owned hospital may be found to be carrying
on a governmental function in the manner of its operation,
whereas in another instance a finding may be made that a
municipally owned hospital is being operated in a proprie-
tary capacity." 26
Needless to say, a fire department also may operate in both
capacities.
The profit test is not the only one which has been used to
place an activity in one category or the other. The varying tests
are as diverse as the states that apply them. The test applied in
Wooster v. Arbenz27 has been generally adopted by the Ohio
23 Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N.W. 274 (1909).
24 Ohio decisions reflect similar confusion. In Hall v. City of Youngstown,
15 Ohio St. 2d 160, 239 N.E. 2d 57 (1968), the court states: ". . . a city might
be acting in a governmental capacity in providing men and equipment with
which to fight fires and nevertheless be acting in a proprietary capacity in
providing hydrants (from which water might be obtained to fight fires) as
part of a municipal water system."
25 2 Ohio St. 2d 155, 207 N.E. 2d 547 (1965).
26 2 Ohio St. 2d 155 (1965), at Syllabus 2.
27 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927).
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courts as the controlling one . 2  Quoting from that opinion:
"First of all, let us ascertain the tests whereby these dis-
tinctions are made. In performing those duties which are
imposed upon the state as obligations of sovereignty, such
as protection from crime, or fires, or contagion, or preserving
the peace and health of citizens and protecting their prop-
erty, it is settled that the function is governmental, and if
the municipality undertakes the performance of those func-
tions, whether voluntarily or by legislative imposition, the
municipality becomes an arm of sovereignty and a govern-
mental agency and is entitled to that immunity from liability
which is enjoyed by the state itself. (Note here that the
court assumes the existence of state sovereign immunity and
implies that without that immunity, there can be no munici-
pal immunity.) If on the other hand, there is no obligation
on the part of the municipality to perform them, but it does
in fact do so for the comfort and convenience of its citizens,
for which the city is directly compensated by levying assess-
ments on property, or where it is indirectly benefited by
growth and prosperity of the city and its citizens, and the
city has an election whether to do or omit to do those acts,
the function is private and proprietary. 9
"Another familiar test is whether the act is done for the com-
mon good of all the people of the state or whether it relates
to special corporate benefit or profit." (Emphasis added)30
In the above case the question was whether the maintenance of
streets was proprietary or governmental. In finding that it was
governmental (thus allowing the city to escape liability) the
court stated:
28 See: Eversole v. City of Columbus, 169 Ohio St. 205, 158 N.E. 2d 515
(1959); Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E. 2d 857 (1963);
Maloney v. City of Columbus, 2 Ohio St. 2d 213, 208 N.E. 2d 141 (1965)
(municipality held liable for negligence in maintaining a zoo- ". . . (w) e
find that there is no obligation upon the defendant to maintain a zoo.")
State ex rel. Fejes v. City of Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47, 213 N.E. 2d 353 (1966);
Gabris v. Blake, City of Columbus, 9 Ohio St. 2d 71, 223 N.E. 2d 597 (1967)
(city held not liable for injuries to five year old boy caused by defective
condition of one of its police vehicles); Fankhauser v. City of Mansfield,
19 Ohio St. 2d 102, 249 N.E. 2d 789 (1969).
29 In Hyde v. City of Lakewood, referred to at note 25 supra and text accom-
panying same, Justice Herbert quoted this same language in his dissenting
opinion. Objecting to that portion of the Court's opinion which allowed a
municipal hospital to escape liability for its tortious conduct, he stated: "I
can conclude only that the weight of authority and the modern view are that
a hospital established under a permissive statute by a municipality is en-
gaged in a proprietary function and is liable for its tortious conduct." In
that same opinion, Herbert stated at page 160: "It is difficult to understand
how a municipal hospital can claim governmental immunity when it per-
forms no services in the exercise of state sovereignty."
50 116 Ohio St. 281, 284-285, 156 N.E. 210 (1927).
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"The State of Ohio has always recognized its obligation to
keep the public ways open, and has ... enjoined by section
3714, General Code, (now § 723.01, Ohio Rev. Code) upon
municipalities an obligation to keep them open, in repair,
and free from nuisance." 31
Has the State of Ohio always (or ever) recognized any obligation
by a fire department to provide any form of ambulance service?
The only section of the Code which commands a fire department
created by a municipal corporation to do anything specifically is
§ 737.11, which provides:
"The fire department shall protect the lives and property of
the people in case of fire." (Emphasis added)
and
... shall perform such other duties as are provided by
ordinance."
Presumably, it is this section which imposes upon the fire depart-
ment of a municipality the obligations of state sovereignty which
the State regards to be exercisable in the stead of the State itself.
It therefore appears that the State of Ohio has never recognized
any obligation by a fire department to provide ambulance serv-
ice. It logically follows, then, that the operation of an ambulance
service or resuscitator unit by a fire department is a proprietary
function, for which the municipality may be held liable. This
position is reinforced by the last words of Ohio Rev. Code
§ 737.11, quoted above (i.e. "such other duties as are provided by
ordinance") and by the language of § 737.21 Ohio Rev. Code, as
interpreted by the 1967 Ohio Attorney General's Opinion, num-
ber 67-078. The latter statute provides, in part:
"The legislative authority of a municipal corporation may
establish all necessary regulations to guard against the
occurrence of fires, protect the property and lives of its citi-
zens against damage and accidents resulting therefrom, and
for such purpose may establish and maintain a fire depart-
ment, (and) provide for the establishment and organization
of fire engine and hose companies and rescue units." (Em-
phasis added)
A careful reading of this permissive statute (of the same type
referred to by Dissenting Justice Herbert in Hyde v. City of
Lakewood) 32 discloses that rescue units are to be established by
31 Supra note 27, at 286-287.
32 Supra note 29.
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fire departments solely to protect the property and lives of citi-
zens from damage and accidents resulting from fire. The follow-
ing two questions were submitted to the Office of the Attorney
General of the State of Ohio:
(1) "May a city operating under a statutory form of
government create a department, other than those depart-
ments already authorized under the Revised Code of Ohio,
to handle various matters such as . . . (an) ambulance
service?"
(2) "To what extent and under what authority can
ambulance services be provided the citizens of a municipal
corporation outside fire situations?"
In response, the following answers were issued:
(1) "The officers and departments of a noncharter city
operating under a general plan of municipal government are
limited to those found in Title VII of the Revised Code.
Title VII does not provide for a separate department of
municipal government to handle matters such as .. . ambu-
lance service, and no authority was found for a city operat-
ing under a general plan of government to create such a
department." 33
(2) "In section 737.21, Revised Code, the words 'result-
ing therefrom' clearly indicate that the function of a munici-
pal fire department, and by implication, its emergency am-
bulance service, is to protect the property and lives of citi-
zens of the municipality from damage and accidents result-
ing from fire. Section 737.21, Revised Code, does not, in my
opinion, authorize a fire department affected by that statute,
to offer ambulance service except as such service is incident
to the fire-fighting functions of the department. However,
section 737.11, Revised Code, provides: 'Both the police and
fire departments shall perform such other duties as are pro-
vided by ordinance.' It therefore appears that the fire de-
partment could be assigned, by ordinance, the duty of fur-
nishing emergency ambulance service unrelated to damage
and accidents resulting from fire .... The service, provided
by ordinance, would be in addition to the ambulance service
relating to damage and accidents resulting from fire as au-
thorized in section 737.21, Revised Code, .. ." 
It therefore seems that a municipality may by ordinance
authorize the type of services herein discussed. If such an ordi-
33 Opinions of the Attorney General, 67-078, p. 2-133.
34 Supra note 33, p. 2-135.
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nance is not passed, the validity of the service is questionable,
and the activity is one step further removed from an effective
claim that the service has been imposed upon the municipality
as an incident of sovereignty. Thus in the absence of such an
ordinance it is extremely likely that the exercise of these activ-
ities will be held to be a proprietary function. However, it is
submitted that the distinction should not hinge upon the exist-
ence or non-existence of a municipal ordinance. If the service
provided by the municipality is entirely voluntary, there being
no mandate from the state to provide the same, it appears that
the justification for immunity is lacking and that no immunity
may logically be imputed from the state, notwithstanding the
presence of a local ordinance.
Because of the confusion over the distinction between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions, and because of the apparent
absence of any sound reason for continuing to recognize munici-
pal immunity, some courts and many writers have recommended
the abolition or restriction of governmental immunity. For ex-
ample, in B. W. King, Inc. v. West New York35 the court stated:
"In fixing municipal liability for torts there has been a more
or less blind adherence to the municipal proprietary-govern-
mental distinction, without real consideration of the reasons
which gave birth to that doctrine and of whether, in the light
of the general expansion of municipal activity, the doctrine
has not outlived its usefulness .... There is a consensus that
most of the reasons for immunity have expired and that mu-
nicipal liability should be subject to less restrictive limits.
. ..The analytical approach ought not to be one of asking
why immunity should not apply in a given situation, but
rather one of asking whether there is any reason why it
should apply." (Emphasis added)
And in a Note36 on Hall v. City of Youngstown 37 the author
states what is in reality the test most often employed, whether
or not it is ostensibly the one used:
"Doctrines which subvert the primary municipal functions
of providing public services should be discouraged. On the
other hand, doctrines which force injured individuals to bear
the burden of the negligence of municipalities in performing
these functions should also be discouraged. Thus, in deter-
35 230 A. 2d 133, 136-137 (1967).
36 Case Note, Municipal Tort Immunity, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 214, 217 (1968).
37 11 Ohio App. 2d 195, 229 N.E. 2d 660 (1967). This note discusses the Ap-
pellate Court's decision in the case. The disposition by the Supreme Court
of Ohio is indicated at note 24 supra.
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mining whether to subject a municipality to liability for its
negligence, these two policy considerations must be accom-
modated."
In many cases there exists an additional reason for refusing
immunity, namely, the presence of a liability insurance policy
covering the negligence of the municipal employee. In such sit-
uations what possible justification can be advanced for allowing
immunity? 3 The doctrine of immunity, as noted above,39 was
based principally on the tenuous financial structure of early gov-
ernmental units. But this justification obviously cannot be used
by a present-day insurance company, which is in the business of
assuming the risks of liability, and which is expected by society
to compensate those citizens of the community who are injured
by the negligent actions of municipal employees. To allow the
insurance company to escape liability (through the invocation of
governmental immunity) is to allow it to receive the benefit of
the premiums collected by it without taking any significant risk
of ever having to make any disbursements. The enlightened view
of some courts4° is that governmental immunity is removed to
the extent of insurance policy coverage. At least one court has
stated that the procurement of liability insurance covering a par-
ticular activity is competent evidence of the proprietary charac-
ter of that activity.41 Such a position seems eminently reasonable.
There seems to be no valid reason why anyone should refuse
to acknowledge that the cost of obtaining government services
legitimately includes the cost of compensating for injuries which
arise from all activities, whether proprietary or governmental.
The expense of paying for any harm negligently caused by fire-
men or other municipal employees should be regarded as part of
the normal and proper costs of public administration and not as
a diversion of public funds. Inevitably members of the fire de-
partment will, in the course of their various functions, negligent-
ly visit harm upon some innocent member of the community.
Regardless of the specific activity in which the firemen were en-
gaged at the time, it would seem that the fairest method of deal-
38 Admittedly, if the defense of municipal immunity is disallowed, insur-
ance companies are likely to raise their premiums, but not enough to make
the cost of liability insurance prohibitive.
39 Supra page 109.
40 See cases collected at Annot. 68 A.L.R. 2d 1437 (1959).
41 Revis v. Asheville, 207 N.C. 237, 176 S.E. 738 (1934).
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ing with the problem is to have the municipality (indirectly, the
entire community) assume the financial responsibility for the in-
jury suffered by the community member. Surely the city and its
total population constitute a far better loss-distributing agency
than do the injured person and his family. Declared Abraham
Lincoln:
"It is as much the duty of government to render prompt jus-
tice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer
the same between private individuals." 42
In summary, it is submitted that the doctrine of municipal
immunity should be abrogated or restricted, and that the govern-
mental-proprietary test, with its attendant inconsistencies, should
either be eliminated or substantially modified. It should be re-
membered that even the total abolition of governmental immu-
nity would not give rise to automatic liability, but simply to a
right to recover when negligence is established. 43
M. Effect of the Statutes Comprising the Uniform Traffic Law
It seems appropriate at this point to consider the Ohio stat-
utes specifically applicable to the operation of emergency vehi-
cles, since a rescue unit, ambulance, or resuscitator unit operated
by a fire department appears to fall within that classification.
As one might suppose, when these statutes (composing the Uni-
form Traffic Act) are not complied with, the immunity which
they confer is lost.
The first of these statutes to be examined is § 4511.03 Ohio
Rev. Code. This act, entitled "Emergency Vehicles Entitled to
Proceed Cautiously Past Red or Stop Signal," provides:
"The driver of any emergency vehicle, when responding to
an emergency call, upon approaching a red or stop signal
shall slow down as necessary for safety to traffic, but may
proceed cautiously past such red or stop sign or signal with
due regard for the safety of all persons using the street or
highway."
Cases construing this statute have held:
"... (A)n emergency vehicle may lawfully proceed past a
red traffic signal but only if, on approaching such traffic sig-
nal, it slows down as necessary for safety to traffic and only
42 Statement by Abraham Lincoln quoted from 6 Richardson, Messages and
Papers of the Presidents 51 (1897).
43 See Case Note, Municipal Tort Immunity, 37 Cn. L. Rev. 214, 217 (1968).
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if it proceeds cautiously past such signal with due regard for
the safety of all persons using the street or highway." 44
"A driver of an emergency vehicle who proceeds through a
red light at a speed of between 35 and 50 miles an hour, with
his view to the left obstructed by a building, is not protected
by the provisions of section 4511.03, R.C." 45
and
"Where defendant... drove past a stop sign without yielding
the right-of-way, claiming a privilege to do so under Section
4511.03 R.C., allowing emergency vehicles to proceed through
stop signals with caution, the burden is upon him to show
that his vehicle qualifies as an emergency vehicle, that at
the time of the accident it was equipped with a flashing red
light or lights and with a siren, exhaust whistle or bell, that
both lights and audible signals were working and that he
was proceeding with due regard for the safety of other per-
sons and property on the roadway." 4G
The second statute to be considered is § 4511.24 Ohio Rev. Code,
which provides:
"The prima facie speed limitations set forth in Section 4511.21
of the Revised Code do not apply to emergency vehicles
when they are responding to emergency calls, and when the
drivers thereof sound audible signals by bell, siren or ex-
haust whistle. This section does not relieve the driver of an
emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard
for the safety of all persons using the street or highway."
This enactment was discussed in City of Worthington v. O'Dea,
47
as follows:
"A police vehicle which proceeds through a major intersec-
tion in a municipality, against a flashing caution signal, at
a speed of 60 to 65 miles per hour, with inadequate use of its
siren, and without being appreciably braked by its operator,
is not being operated 'with due regard for the safety of all
persons upon the highway.'"
The final statute to be examined is § 4511.45 Ohio Rev. Code,
which establishes that emergency vehicles have the right-of-way
and adds:
44 Parton v. Weilnau, 169 Ohio St. 145, 8 Ohio Op. 2d 134 (1959) at Headnote
#4.
45 State v. Leggett, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 400, 166 N.E. 2d 772 (1959).
46 State v. Reid, 79 Ohio L. Abs. 475, 156 N.E. 2d 510 (1958).
47 115 Ohio App. 375, 185 N.E. 2d 323 (1962) at Headnote #1.
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"This section does not relieve the driver of an emergency
vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons and property on the highway."
It is generally understood by drivers that an emergency vehicle
has the right-of-way, but Parton v. Weilnau48 places a qualifica-
tion on that rule, as the following statement indicates:
"Where a vehicle is not 'proceeding in a lawful manner in
approaching or crossing' an intersection, such vehicle loses
its preferential status." 40
From the foregoing statutes and cases it may be seen that so
long as the driver of an emergency vehicle exercises ordinary
care for the safety of others, he has a preferential status on the
highway. Obviously, if this standard of care were always ob-
served by drivers of emergency vehicles, there would be no need
to rely on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However in prac-
tice this standard is often not met, and this raises the question of
whether the driver of an emergency vehicle, who is already
given special statutory driving privileges, should, in addition, be
permitted in some instances to invoke the defense of governmen-
tal immunity. It would seem that the only question should be
whether the driver operated his particular vehicle with enough
care to entitle him to the statutory preferred position on the high-
ways. Whether or not he was engaged by the municipality in the
exercise of a nebulously-defined "governmental" function should,
it is submitted, be immaterial.
In Farish v. Springfield,50 the Clark County Court of Ap-
peals held that the statutes comprising the Uniform Traffic Act
(just discussed) are not inconsistent with the "immunity stat-
ute." 51 If this decision is correct, what effect did the passage of
the Uniform Traffic Act have? At the time these statutes were
passed, drivers of police and fire emergency vehicles already had
an absolute immunity from suit for their conduct behind the
wheel as long as it was found (which it usually was) that they
were engaged in the performance of a governmental function.
One faces the question of whether the Ohio General Assembly
intended that this broad immunity be continued or whether they
intended to restrict the same. If the intent was to continue the
48 Supra note 44.
49 169 Ohio St. 145 at Headnote 3, 158 N.E. 2d 719 (1959).
50 109 Ohio App. 228, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 463 (1959).
5' Ohio Rev. Code § 701.02 (1965).
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old immunity, why did the legislature, knowing that most emer-
gency vehicles are operated by employees of some governmental
unit within the state, bother to impose upon them a duty of due
care? If the driver, or municipality, is permitted to invoke the
defense of governmental immunity, it is of no moment whether
or not the vehicle was operated with due care. Logic therefore
seems to dictate that the Uniform Traffic Act was intended to
limit the existing immunity and to curb the unconscionable re-
sults which were being reached by the courts. If the legislature
intended to exclude from the Act the drivers of fire and police
department emergency vehicles, the legislators could easily have
inserted an express exclusion. It is submitted that the most rea-
sonable interpretation of the Act is that compliance with its pro-
visions, specifically the "due care" requirement, is a condition
precedent to the immunity granted by § 701.02 Ohio Rev. Code.
In other words, if it is first found that the fireman or other mu-
nicipal employee was proceeding with due care (as required by
the provisions of the Uniform Traffic Act) 52 then the court should
consider whether he falls within the immunity coverage of§ 701.02 Ohio Revised Code. The recommended interpretation of
the Act's language would not impose the same standard of "due
care" upon the driver of an emergency vehicle as that which is
imposed on the ordinary automobile driver. Rather, in keeping
with the tenor of the statutes quoted, the standard should be the
degree of care that would be exercised by the reasonably prudent
ambulance (or other emergency vehicle) driver. Thus if it is
found that the municipal employee was a reasonably prudent
emergency driver, although his conduct would constitute negli-
gence in the usual tort case, he would be entitled to rely upon
§ 701.02 Ohio Rev. Code.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, it is submitted, first, that the courts have a
duty to eliminate or at least curtail the doctrine of municipal
immunity. "The argument that the legislature, not the court, is
the one to make this change, is answered by the fact that the
principle was created by the courts as part of the common law,
and if error exists or if the principle has become antiquated, it
is the duty of the courts to change it." 53 Municipalities no longer
52 ,,... with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street or
highway." §§ 4511.03 and 4511.04 Ohio Rev. Code (1965).
53 Perkins v. State of Indiana, 251 N.E. 2d 30 (1969).
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confine themselves to the relatively few activities in which they
engaged at the time this doctrine was first accepted in this coun-
try, and many of the new functions now performed by municipal-
ities have no apparent relation to traditional governmental
activity.
"Municipal functions have become so varied and extensive
that public safety demands that municipal employees be held
to the same safety standards as other citizens. Private citi-
zens for good economic reasons insure themselves against
tort liability. Why shouldn't a collection of citizens classified
as a municipality do likewise?" 54
Compensation for injuries which arise out of any form of mu-
nicipal activity, regardless of its nature, should be regarded as
simply a cost of doing business. The adoption of such a view
would probably tend to increase awareness on the part of mu-
nicipalities and their employees of their obligations to their cities'
inhabitants.
Secondly, it seems clear that Ohio cities are not required by
law to establish rescue squads, ambulance service, or resuscita-
tor units. Thus a city operating such services, which admittedly
are beneficial, should not be able to claim governmental immu-
nity, whether or not the city has enacted an ordinance establish-
ing the service. There is no justification in the law or in public
policy for granting the municipality such immunity and letting
the innocent victim go uncompensated.
Finally, it is not reasonable to suppose that the Ohio General
Assembly, in passing the Uniform Traffic Act, intended to grant
to (or perpetuate in) emergency vehicle drivers a license to
negligently injure one group of persons while going to the aid of
another. The provisions of the Act should be construed as ex-
posing to liability any fireman (or other emergency vehicle
driver) who injures another while failing to exercise due care.
That the fireman was performing a governmental function at the
time should be immaterial. One writer has commented: "Joan
of Arc did not enthrone her king to exempt him from the dic-
tates of justice, and the American colonists did not cast off the
yoke of George III to exalt tyranny by denying reparation for
harms caused by governmental maladministration." 55
JoHN D. SHUFF
54 32 American Trial Lawyer's Journal 289 (1968).
55 Roberts, Sovereign Immunity, 12 American Trial Lawyer's Association
Newsletter 431 (1969).
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 3 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/3
3 AKRON LAW REVIEW (2)
APPENDIX
The following questions were asked of ten cities in the State
of Ohio. Responses were obtained from eight of those cities:
1. Does yor municipality operate, in conjunction with either
the fire or police department, an ambulance and/or rescue unit
service?
Canton, Ohio (x) Yes ( ) No (x) Fire Dept. ( ) Police
Cincinnati, Ohio (x) Yes ( ) No (x) Fire Dept. (x) Police
Elyria, Ohio ( ) Yes (x) No ( ) Fire Dept. ( ) Police
Lima, Ohio (x) Yes ( ) No (x) Fire Dept. ( ) Police
Mansfield, Ohio (x) Yes ( ) No (x) Fire Dept. ( ) Police
Springfield, Ohio (x) Yes ( ) No (x) Fire Dept. ( ) Police
Toledo, Ohio (x) Yes ( ) No (x) Fire Dept. ( ) Police
Zanesville, Ohio ( ) Yes (x) No ( ) Fire Dept. ( ) Police
2. If so, are the functions of said service related solely to
injuries, damage, or accidents resulting from fire in the case of
service rendered by the fire department?
Canton ( ) Yes (x) No
Cincinnati ( ) Yes (x) No
Lima ( ) Yes (x) No
Mansfield ()Yes (x) No
Springfield ( ) Yes (x) No
Toledo ( ) Yes (x) No
3. If the duties of said service are general and not limited
to functions performed in connection with fire, has any ordinance
been passed by the legislative body of your municipality formally
establishing this service?
Canton (x) Yes ( ) No
Cincinnati (x) Yes ( ) No
Lima (x) Yes ()No
Mansfield ( ) Yes (x) No
Springfield ( ) Yes (x) No
Toledo ( ) Yes (x) No
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4. If these services are general, is any
recipients thereof for them?
Canton ( ) Yes
Cincinnati ( ) Yes
Lima ( ) Yes
Mansfield ()Yes
Springfield ( ) Yes
Toledo ( ) Yes
5. Is your municipality a statutory
under a charter form of government?
Canton
Cincinnati-
Elyria
Lima
Mansfield
Springfield
Toledo
Zanesville
Statutory
Statutory
Statutory
Statutory
Statutory
Statutory
Statutory
Statutory
charge made to the
city or do you operate
Charter
Charter
Charter
Charter
Charter
Charter
Charter
Charter
JoHN D. SHuFF
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